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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
\"S. 
RICillRD JESSUP, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT 
Defendant, hereinafter called the appellant, h; 
seeking to reverse the trial court on two general 
'Propositions of law: First, (App. Br. p. 2) that 
the trial court .erred in overruling defendant's mo-
tion to quash the information, and Second, (App. 
Br. p. 11) that the trial court erred in overruling 
appellant's motion for a directed verdict. 
The information charges the appellant in the 
language of the statute (Sec. 1103-51-2, Laws of 
Utah, 1935, page 220), that he, on or about the 1st 
day of September, 1939, at Washington County, 
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2 
State of Utah, "did cohabit with more than one 
·person of the opposite sex.'' 
ASSIGmfENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1, 4, 5, AND 
10 
Appellant's motion to quash i·s argued upon 
the grounds that: (A) the information fails to 
state a public offense; (B) that the criminal act 
under which it is drawn is (1) unconstitutional, 
(a) because it provides for more than one subjeet
1 (b) because the title does not cover its subjects, 
(c) because it combines a criminal and civil statute, 
(d) because it is inconsistent with other acts, and 
(e) because it provides that a wife must testify 
against her husband; and (2) the said section fail's 
to set forth or describe a crime; (C) that the in-
formation fails to comply with the section stating 
the crim~. 
(A) 
It ·seems as though appellant has exerted him-
self to list a volume of possible objections rather 
than to cite tenable objections and objections of 
:merit. His argument is that the charging part of 
thP information (which is also the words of the 
statute), to-wit: "did cohabit with more than one 
person'' are merely ''words of wind'' and can 
mean to dwell with one's brothers, sisters, or even 
children; that said charging part ·should have ad-
jectives such as "lewdly and laciviously cohabit" 
in order to give criminal import to said charging-
part. 
In order to follow appellant's argument, the 
le.oislative act would have to be distorted to 'include th~ crime of bigamy. One of the e'ssential elements 
of bigamy is that of sexual intercourse. Said 
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element ''is not a necessary ingredient in the crime 
'Of unlawful cohabitation.'' 
State v. Springer, 40 Ut. 471; 121 Pac. 976. 
United States Y. Cannon, 4 Utah 122; 
~lifirmed 116 U. S. 55, and 
United States v. Mus'8er, 4 Utah 153. 
The Cannon and Musser cases are based on the 
''Edmunds .Act. •' which is designed to protect 
monogamous marriages. (See U. S. v. Cannon, 4 
Ut. 141). The charging part of the Edmunds Act 
is 'Similar to the Act under which appellant is 
charged, to wit : ''If any male person . . . here-
after cohabits with more than one woman, he shall 
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." Mr. Justice 
Zane, through 
L"nited States v. ~Iusser, 4 Utah, at page 
156: ·says: 
"We are of the opinion that the weight of 
authority is to the effect that the crime of 
unlawful cohabitation, as defined in the 
statute under consideration, is made with-
out proof of sexual intercourse, and that 
proof of non-intercourse is not a defense. 
. . . We mav assume that the authors of 
this law had~ mind the institution of mar-
riage, because they expres·sly declared that 
any man who having a wife, marries an-
other, is guilty of a crime, and that any 
male person who cohabits with more than 
one woman is guilty of unlawful cohabita-
tion. They had in view the evil effects of such 
practices. The end of the law was the protec-
tion of the monogamous ·marriage, and the 
suppression of polygamy and unlawful co-
habitation was but a means to that end. It 
is proper also to take into consideration 
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the conditions as the national legislature 
anticipated and underl:itood them in which 
the law was to be applied and enforced. 
They knew the time had elapsed within 
which a very large portion of those living 
in polygamy could be punished for 1that 
offense, and that many of these were 
among the rnost influential men in ·society, 
being the heads of the church, and that 
the example of their continuing to live 
with their plural wives under a claim of 
divine right, would be a scandal to society 
and tt menace to the lawful marriage; that 
such examples would be a continuing in-
vitation and apparent justification for 
their followers either ·secretly or openiy to 
violate the law. Congress, therefore, for-
bade plural marriage in appearance only, 
as well as in form, and by the example of 
punishment it doubtless intended to erad-
icate the example of apparent plural mar-
riages a·s well as the plural marriage in 
form .... " 
The information is based on the new Code of 
Criminal Proeedure, which prescribes a short form 
of information and further pre-scribes that an in-
formation is good if drawn in terms of the statute 
defining the offense and is sufficient to give the 
court and defendant notice of what offense is in-
tended to be charged. (Section 105-21-9, Laws of 
Utah, 1935). The information being drawn in the 
words of the statute meets the statutory require-
ment of validity. 
Appellant's complaint that the wording of the 
information was not sufficiently explanatory could 
have been well supplied by a Bill of Particulars. 
This was not requested by the appellant; neither 
did the court request the State to give the appel-
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lant a Bill of P<u·ticulars. The appellant is not in 
a IJO~ition to complain of the information not be-
ing specific and sufficiently e~-planatory when ho 
sits idly by and doe-::; not avail himself of his stat-
utory right to be particuhuly apprised of the crime 
of which he is charged. 
One person may think that an information 
charging him in plain, short, and understandable 
language .. that he cohabited wi.th more than one 
person of the opposite o.sex, '' informs him better of 
the offense than an information drawn with great 
detail after the order of an old common law plead-
ing. \\bile the con'\"'"erse may be tn1e with another 
accu::::ed per~on, the merits of the long and short 
form of indictments or informations are discussed 
in 
State v. RDy (1936), 40 N. M.; 60 Pac. 
{2d) 646; 110 A.L.R. 1. 
B-1 (a) 
(1) .Appellant's next ground, advanced 
through his motion tD qu~.sh, is that the statute 
under which the information is drawn is uncon-
·stitutional; because it contains more than one sub-
ject. Said act comprises 
Chapter 112, Laws of Utah, 1935. 
It reads as follows : 
"If any person cohabits with more than 
one person of the opposite sex, such per-
son is guilty of a felony. 
''Any person, except the defendant, may 
be compelled to testify in a prosecution for 
unlawful cohabitation; provided, however, 
that the evidence given in such proseeu-
tion shall not be used agairrst him in any 
proceeding, civil •or criminal, except for 
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6 
perjury in giving such testimony. A per-
son so testifying shall not thereafter be 
liable to indictment, prosecution, or puni'sh-
Inent for the offense concerning~ which such 
testimony was given.'' 
It will be noted that the Act deals with the 
penal code and concerns onlv sexual offense-s. Al-. 
most every Act of the Leg1~lature can b_e divided 
so that it will contain two or more subjects from 
a :-;trict grammatical point of view. 'rhat is to 
say, if an Act contains two sentences, it contains 
two subjects. It would be utterly ridiculous to say 
that the framers of the Constitution intended, 
through Article VI, Section 23, to prohibit all 
legislative Acts containing more than one sentence. 
Appellant's cited case of State v. Green, 68 Utah 
251; 249 Pac. 1016, treats this point quite exhaust-
ively. The opinion in the Utah report, at page ·277, 
quoting another opinion, says: 
'':Manifestly th~ purpose of this provision 
of the Constitution is to prevent the Legis-
lature from intermingling in one act two 
or more separate and distinct propositions 
- things which, in a legal sense, have no 
connection with, or proper relation to, 
each other. The reasons for, and the 
scope of, constitutional provisions of this 
character, are well illustrated in 26 Am. 
& Eng. Enc. Law (2d) 575, in the following1 
language: 
'' 'This requirement of singleness is not 
int~nded to embarrass honest legislation, 
hut only to prevent the vicious practice of 
joining, in one act, incongruous and un-
related matters; and, if all the parts of a 
statute have a natural connection and 
reasonably relate>, directly or indirectly to 
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7 
one general and legitimate subject of legis-
lation, the act is not open to the objection 
of plurality, no matter how exte.nsively or 
minutely it deals with the details looking 
to the accomplishment of the main legis-
la th·e purpose'. '' 
Said Green opinion at page 281 reeites that on 
tweh·e different cases litigants have raised the 
question of statutes being unconstitutional be-
cause they contained more than one subject and 
only one has been successfully contested. 
The Green case seems to be quite in point with 
the instant case. In the Green case, the horseracing 
act was contested as being unconstitutional because 
it contained n1ore than one subject, towit: that of 
horseracing and that of betting or wagering by way 
of the pari-mutuel system. The Green case held 
that the act did not contain more than one subject 
within the purview of the framers of the Con-
stitution. 
The subjects in the instant case do not appear 
to be as distinct and separate as do the subjects in 
the Green case. Cohabitation; compelling a person 
to testify, u8ing evidence in civil or criminal pro-
ceedings, and liability to prosecution for giving 
testimony, all relate to- the criminal code and to 
sex offenses. Hence, we believe that within the 
contemplation of the framers of the constitutional 
provision (Article VI, Section 23), Chapter 112, 
Laws of Utah, 1935, does not contain two subjects. 
Even if said Chapter 112 was unconstitutional, this-, 
appellant could not avail himself of its unconstitu-
tionalitv because his case dealt only ·with one sub-
ject- that of unlawful cohabitatio~. His wife wa~ 
not compelled to testify a}~ainst him; neither was 
his purported plural wife; hence no occasion arose 
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for such evidence to be used against him in civil 
or criminal cases, and therefore, no liability could 
arise out of the giving of such evidence. 
Suppose the Legislature, to avoid any assail-
ing of its Act upon appellant's contention, divided 
said Section 103-51-2, Laws of Utah, 1935, into four 
distinct and separate bills- {1) on unlawful co-
habitation; (2) on compelling a witness to testify; 
un on using evidence in civil or criminal proceed-
ings; and ( 4) on exempting one who testifies, from 
liability. Each bill would have to be interlocking 
and references tied to each other in order to give 
the full meaning of the intent of the Legislature. 
All cow;;titutional or legislative Acts are supposeq 
to be based on reason and public policy. Would. it 
be more reasonable tq draft the ·contents of said 
Section 103-51-2 in four separate bills ·than to draft 
it in one? Could said section be more clearly, ex.-
pressed through interlocking phraseology of ~our 
bills necessary to give the contents of said sectio11;? 
What public policy would favor express.~:p.g; 1 ~~~<J 
Section 103-51-2 in four bills? Th~se que~tions 
clearly answer themselves. 1 
B-1 (b) ~ . ) 
Appellant next: complairis of Ch1apter ]_i'2';'L~~s 
of Utah, 1935, being unconstitutional because, ·its. 
title does not express all)ts sp_bj~cts ., .·He qubtes 
59 C. J. 812 and State Fair f. G;r~en, ,6~ Utah 251~ 
as saying ''all parts of an f\Ct whi~ch, ·are. not. within 
the title are unconstitutiqn.:~J and vo~d. n ' Said Cor-
nus Juris cib.tion more flillv stated, reads as fol-
lows (Page~ 811~8~4): .. : , · . . . 
~ I I 
Sec. 393: ''Since a constitutional r~quire-
ment that the subject .of a statute be ex-
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9 
pressed in its title is generally regarded as 
mandatory, the title is an essential p~u·t of 
an act, and the- subject express.ed in the 
title fixes tl1e limit of the valid scope of the 
act. The pro\isions of an act must cor-
respond with the subject expressed in its 
title; so nothing can validly be included 
in the body of a statute which is not ex-
pressed in or covered by the title, and all 
parts of an act which are not within its 
title are unconstitutional and void, even 
though such provisions might properly 
ha\e been included in the act under a 
broader title. All matters, hO\vever, 
which are germane to, and naturally con-
nected with, the subject anno-unced by the 
title of an act and not excluded thereby 
are covered by it and may validly be in-
cluded in the statute; and for the purpose 
of determining whether or not a provision 
is germane to the title a reasonable mean-
ing should be given to the words and con-
text of the provision. 
Sec. 394: ''Any means or provisions rea-
sonably adapted to carry,.. out and make 
effectual the principal object or purpose 
of a statute as disclosed by its title may 
be included in the body of the act, although 
not expressed or referred to in the title, 
without violating a constitutional provi-
sion requiring the subject of an act to be 
expre~sed in its title.'' 
It will be noted that appellant has failed to 
descend this above quoted gPneral principle of law 
down to the particulars of the instant case, as is 
announced in Section 394, supra, and also as iB 
held "t.y the above Green case. In the Green case, 
the horseracing statute was assailed as being un-
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10 
constitutional, because, among other reasons, parts 
of the act were not within the title, henee, such 
parts were void. The title of said horseracing act 
read: ''An Act Relating to Hors.eracing and Pro-
viding for the Creation of a State Racing Commis-
sion and Defining its Powers and Duties and Re-
,pealing all Acts .and Parts. of Acts in Conflict 
Therewith.'' Section 6 of the act permits betting 
after the order of the pari-mutuel system. Appel-
lant contended in said Green case th.at :said Sec-
tion 6 was not expressed in the title of the act. 
The Court held to the contrary on the theory that 
the pari-mutuel system of betting is associated and 
connected with horseracing. A note at page 814 of 
the above quoted Corpus Juris citation quotes the 
rule announced by Mr. Justice Straup in State Fair 
v. Green, supra, to be as follows: 
''A provision in a bill to be germane to the 
subject expressed in the title is not re-
quired to be a necessary or ev-en a usual 
or customary incident to the subject so ex-
pressed in the title. It is. enough if it is 
directly or indirectly related to, and bears 
a natural connection with, sucb general 
subject, and such connection or relation-
ship need not even be logical, but must be 
harmonious, and not discordant, with the 
expressed subject.'' 
An examination of the above authorities read-
ily shows that the body of Section 103-51-2, supra. 
is germane, rPlated to and couchPd under the title 
of said section. To follow appellant's motion in 
the instant case? the title of the act would be about 
~as large as the body of it and would express its suh-
stance about as much as it would be expressed in 
the body of the act. It seems clear that the con-
stitutional convention did not intend the legis-
lative bodies to go into great length and particular-
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ity in the title of acts so that every pa.rticular part 
of the act is e~-pressed in its title. :rhe act in question 
we be~ien:>, would haYe been sufficiently expressed 
in its title if said title would have onlv referred to 
unlawful cohabitation; because comp~lling all but 
'the defendant to testify and exempting them from 
criminal and civil liability is directly related to the 
act concerning unlawful cohabitation. 
B-1 (c) 
Appellant next complains because the act com-
bines a criminal and a civil statute. He cites the 
case of State v. Truman, 32 Wash. 294; 73 Pac. 375. 
In the Truman case the act was entitled "An Act 
Relating to Crimes and Punishments, and Pro-
ceedings in Criminal Cases.'' The act then pro-
vided for bastardy proceedings. Held that bastardy 
proceedings were civil, hence, in derogation of the 
constitutional provision providing that every law 
shall oontain but one subj.ect, which shall be ex· 
pressed in its title. 
In the instant case the act only gives the wit-
ness who testifies a privilege to the effect that 
what she says cannot be used against her in any 
criminal or civil action except for perjury. Said 
act has nothing to do with combining a civil action 
with a criminal action or providing for a civil ac-
tion under title of a criminal action as is announced 
in the Truman case. Then, too, the appellant can-
not claim any prejudice to his substantial rights 
because his wife did not testify against him. 
B-1 (d) 
Appellant next complains about the unlawful 
cohabitation act, Chapter 112, as being inconsistent 
with Chapter 118, Section 105-21-39, Laws of Utah, 
1935, in that the former act exempts the wife and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
the plural wife from prosecution aR a~cessories, 
while the latter section includes them as accessor-
ies. We need not bother ourselves with a construc-
tion or explanation of the mentioned inconsistency, 
as it does not concern us because the wife or plural 
wife did not testify in the instant case. 
B-1 (e) 
Appellant next complains that the act, Section 
103-51-2, supra, violates Article I of Section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution, which provides that" a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band.'' This question is not at issue, because appel· 
lant 's wife did not testify against him, hence, he 
i~ not an interested party to complain against the 
unconstitutionality of the act. 
B-1 (d) 
Appellant lists as another reason that the said 
act violates Article I of Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, that it disregards the provision that 
the ''accused shall not be compelled to give evi-
dence against l1imself. '' He raises this question out 
of a twisted reasoning that the complaint should 
have listed his purported wives as accomplices and 
then in this premise the statute provides that the 
purported wife is compelled to testify against her-
self. Appellant, through his contortions of reason-
ing, has apparently, by inadvertance, built thr 
premise of a confession that his purported wives 
should have been listed along with him as accom-
·plices. -.-We submit also that this point is immater 
.ial and not before the Court for con~ideration, for 
the reasons expressed in the preceding subdivision 
B-1 (e). 
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13 
c. 
Appellant complains of the information failing 
to comply with Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935. 
He parallels the info1·mation with a hypothetical 
information charging a public offense as: "John 
Doe committed murder,'' and further says that 
~uch eharge is meaningless, that it is like hanging 
a man beeause he is charged with committing mur-
der when no one has been killed. He then cites 
'"Porms for Certain Offenses," as is prescribed by 
Section 105-21-47, Laws of Utah, 1935, one of whiclt 
is: '' AB murdered CD.'' 
Appellant's hypothetical information would 
'he more parallel if the instant information alleged: 
''Richard Jessup committed unlawful. co.habita-
tion." The information follows the stock statu-
tory rule of pleading (Section 105-21-8, Laws of 
J.Ttah, 1935), which provides it is sufficient if it 
charges the offense by using the name given it by 
'Statut~ by stating so much of the definition of the 
offense in terms of the statute defining it. As 
heretofore stated, the information follows specifi-
cally the wording of the statute defining unlawful 
cohabitation. It seems appellant's complaint is 
that the information does not give the names· of 
the persons of the opposite sex with whom appel-
lant is alleged to have cohabited. Of course, 
through a Bill of Particulars, which he did not re-
quest, the names could have easily been supplied. 
Hence, appellant is in a .poor position to now com-
plain of the failure to supply the names. (State 
v. Roy, supra). Suppose that ,the court would not 
allow the names of the women he is alleged to have 
cohabited with (probably for reasons of public 
'Policy, such as to preserve the character and rep-
utation of the women) to be announced. Query: 
Would the information and proof be essential to 
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14 
warrant a conviction without an allegation and 
'proof of the names of the persons of the opposite 
sex~ Could it he said that the crime of unlawful 
cohabitation was not committed when the charge 
and proof clearly showed that John Doe ".did co-: 
habit with more than one person of the opposite 
sex,'' without alleging and proving the names of 
the persons of the opposite sex~ No matter how 
;overwhelming is the proof of the crimL. should 
justice be defeated because the prosecution does not 
or cannot supply the names of the women the 
accused is alleged to have cohabited with? ''What's 
"in a name - a rose by any other name would smell 
as sweet.'' So, too, the crime of unlawful cohabita-
tion would be as complete by showing the persons 
'that appellant is alleged to have cohabited with 
were of the opposite sex. Yes, "opposite sex" 
more accurately defines them than to list their 
names, for their names might suggest they were of 
the 'male sex. The opposite of ap:pe1larrt 's con-
t•.}ntion is the contention of the appellant in United 
States v. Cannon, 4 Ut. 134, that is to say, the in-
dictment charged that Angus M. Cannon committed 
·the crime of unlawful cohabitation, etc. The in-
formation was contested because it did not allege 
he was a male person. The Court held: 
''An indictment for the offense created by 
Section 3 of the Act of Congress . . . (very 
similar to Section 103-51-2, supra) need not 
state that the defendant is a male person, 
even if the defendant's name be not a dis-
tinctively masculine name. It is presumed 
that the defendant is charged as a male 
person, when he is charged with an 
offpnse 'vhich eon1d only be conunitted b~r 
such a person.'' 
Appellant cites the above Cannon case as an 
authority for holding that the failure to recite thP 
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names of the women the accused is alleged to have 
cohabited with as being "insufficient in not giving 
particulars.'' Said holding is not contra to the 
instant case, because it was appellant's fault in not 
asking for a Bill of Particulars enlarging the in-
formation to include the nan1es of the members 
''of the opposite sex.'' 
As authority for our contention that the in-
formation is sufficient, we cite State v. Roy, supra 
(40 N. M. 397; 60 P. (2d) 646; 110 A.L.R. 1). 
Said Roy case is quite recent (1936) and many of 
the jurisdictions uphold the short form of the in-
dictment. It is too Yoluminous to attempt to set 
out herein. We believe it is a well selected case. 
We invite the Court to read it. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 2, 3. 
Appellant next complains of the insufficiency 
of the evidence to warrant the case going to the 
jury. His complaint is centered on the failure of 
the State's evidence to show that the persons of 
the opposite sex had a fixed residence with the 
appellant. 
The State's first witness called (Tr. p. ,2) was 
Lola Jessup. She was not present. A doctor's 
certificate was produced showing she was physi-
cally unable to be at court (See Judgment Roll). 
The testimony of the State's witness, Deputy 
Sheriff Sam Fullerton, as pertinent reads as fol-
lows (Tr. p. 3): 
"Q. On September 1st, as deputy sheriff, 
and with Antone B. Prince, county sheriff; 
you made a visit to New Harmony, is that 
right? 
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A. Yes. 
1 r• 
.._I) 
Q. At that time did you visit the home 
of Richard Jessup up near New Harmony~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. State just what you saw when you 
went in there, that is with reference to in-
dividuals or persons. 
A. Well, when I went in there was one 
lady setting right to the right of 
the door, as I went in, and another 
lady back a little further, and she left. I 
never only just saw her as she went out the 
hack door. 
Q. Do you know who went out the back 
door1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who was it you saw at the place as 
you first went in~ 
A. Ida Jessup, she told me her name was. 
Q. The wife of Richard Jessup~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did she tell you who went out the back 
door1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who? 
A. She said it was Lola. 
Q. Do you know where Lola went~ 
A. No. 
Q. Did you see Lola again that dayf 
A. No. 
Q. Have you seen Lola since that time? 
A. No. 
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Q. When she went out the back door did 
she run or did sne just walk out t 
A. .,Veil, she went pretty fast.'' 
The testimony of Sheriff Antone B. Prince, 
as pertinent, is as follows (Tr. p. 4): 
'' Q. Did you visit the Richard Jessup 
home that day! (Sept. 1). 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you see Lola Jessup at that 
time! 
A. No. 
Q. Did you know where she was! 
A. I didn't know where she was. We 
couldn't locate her. 
Q. How is that! 
A. I don't know where she was. 
Q. You didn't see her at the home? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have any conversation with 
Richard Jessup with reference to Lola? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he say anything about where she 
was! 
A. He said that he didn't know where 
she had gone. 
Q. Did you see Lola Jessup after that 
day! 
A. Yes. 
Q. When? 
A. The following morning. 
Q. Where did you see her then 1 
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A. In her horne. 
Q. Where~ 
18 
A. In the home of Richard Jessup. 
Q. That is near New Harmony~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the purpose of your visit 
there at that time~ 
A. I went to serve a subpoena on both 
she and Ida Jessup. 
Q. Did you serve a subpoena upon Lola 
Jessup or Johnson~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. What name did you serve the sub-
poena in~ 
A. I think it was Lola Jessup Johnson. 
Q. Lola Jessup Johnson~ 
A. If I remember correctly. I could be 
mistaken.- I served Jessup, I know, I 
wouldn't say ~bout Johnson. I believe it 
was Johnson. 
Q. Did you ask her at that time if she 
'vas Lola Jessup, or do you remember~ 
A. I don't remember making - asking 
that question. 
Q. You did see Lola Jessup, or Lola 
Johnson, at that time~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. ·vVhere was she 1 
A. She was in the living room behind a 
door, sitting on a bed holding a baby 1n 
her arms. 
Q. She was not in bed at that time? 
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A. No. 
Q. Was she at that time apparently in 
good health, as nearly as you could tell t 
A. As near as I could tell, yes. 
Q. "\Vill you state whether or not, if you 
observed, that she was in a pregnant con-
.dition T 
A. Yes, sir." 
Miss Mary Carling testified tl1at she lived at 
New Harmony about two weeks prior to September 
1st; that she is a cousin to Lola Johnson Jessup 
and to Ida Johnson Jessup; that she has known 
Lola Jessup ever since she was a little girl; that 
she was staying with her cousin, Lydia, wife of 
Fred Jessup, which was 30 or 40 yards from the 
Richard Jessup home; that she saw Lola Johnson 
at the Richard Jessup home about September 1st, 
and that she was on a visit at that time; that Lola 
Johnson was pregnant. 
The record shows that the witness, Mary Carl-
ing, was a very unwilling witness and attempted to 
shield her cousins and appellant on facts surround-
ing the commission of the crime. 
The foregoing facts and testimony, appellant 
conte-;·ds, do not establish unlawful cohabitation 
within the meaning of the authorities he has cited, 
in that said facts do not establish a "fixed resi-
dence'' of the ''persons of the opposite sex.'' 
If said facts were all the facts of this case bear-
· ing on the sufficiency of the evidence, we are of. the 
opinion that the issue would be close as to whether 
or not the State made a prima facie case. We· will not 
stop to show the above facts made a prima facie' case·. 
because we believe said facts, coupled with the 
confession of the appellant free and voluntarily 
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given on his own ini)~iative as he was being taken 
to jail, clearly and convincingly establishes the 
State's case. The record, as pertinent, (Tr. p. 23), 
reads: 
"Q. Now, will you state where that con-
versation took place, or that statement was 
made, rather? 
A. vV ell, it was in my car on the road 
from New Harmony. 
Q. Who was in the car at that time~ 
A. Richard Jessup and Fred Jessup, my-
self and Mr. Fullerton. 
Q. vVill you state what that was that Mr. 
Jessup said at that time~ 
A. :Mr. Jessup said that they were being 
persecuted, he didn't say "prosecuted," 
persecuted, for the same thing that their 
fathers had done. 
Q. And did he say anything further at 
that time that you recall? 
A. He said: 'We believe in living the 
laws of God~' as near as I can recall, he 
savs: 'The laws of man are man-made 
la~s,' he says : 'We believe in living 
according to the laws of God.' 
Q. Then what did you do after you 
arrived at St. George~ 
A. ·we put them in the county jail and 
went home." 
Such a confession, coupled with the facts, 
warrants the jury in bringing in their verdict of 
:~uilty after only five minutes of deliberation. 
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ASSIGNMENT NO. 6 
.Appellant objects to the State asking n witness 
if she was acquainted with 4 4 Lola J olmson, some-
times called Lola Jessup,'' on the grounds that no 
one had testified that Lola Johnson was also known 
as Lola Jessup. The record ( Tr. p. 5) shows that 
the sheriff testified to serving a subpoena on Lola 
Jessup Johwon. Hence, even if appellant's ob-
jection was serious, it is cured by the record's 
prior showing Lola Johnson and Lola Jessup was 
one and the same person. 
ASSIGXMENTS 7 AND 9 
Appellant next objects to the court permitting 
testimony of the whereabouts of persons two days 
aiter the arrest of the appellant. We fail to find 
such testimony in the record. We do find testi-
mony concerning the whereabouts of Lola and Ida 
the next day after the arrest. (Tr. p. 28). 
We believe because of the close proximity to 
the time of the alleged crime, no error could arise 
that would reach to the substantial right of the 
appellant, especially in view of the appellant's 
confession. 
ASSIGNMENT NO. 8 
Appellant further complains of the State's 
testimony showing the pregnant condition of Lola 
Johnson. He cites U. S. v. Cannon, 4 Ut. 122, as 
an authority. Said Cannon case holds that it is 
not essential to prove sexual intercourse in order 
'for the State to prove a prima facie case. 
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14 C.J.S., at page 1311, says: 
''As defined in the dictionaries and cases 
the meaning of the word in its broad sense 
is to dwell or live with or together in the 
same place, house, or abode. More spe-
cifically, however, "cohabit" has been de-
fined as meaning to live together as hus-
band and wife, or man and wife, lawfully 
or ~nlawfully as the case may be, as im-
plying sexual intercourse, or the possibil-
ity of sexual access.'' 
Although sexual intercourse is not an essen-
tial element to be proved in the crime of unlawful 
cohabitation, pregnancy of one of the opposite sex 
directly relates to the proof of dwelling together 
as man and wife. Especially is this true when the 
proof is that both of the persons of the opposite 
sex were pregnant (Tr. p. 25). ·We believe that 
the question of pregnancy of Lola Johnson is very 
material and pertipent to the proof of unlawful co-
habitation of the appellant. Even if the fact of 
pregnancy was not material, an overruling of ob-
jection to the introduction of such evidence would 
not be error going to prejudice the substantial 
rights of the appellant. 
We submit that appellant had a fair trial and 
no error was committed by the trial court infring-
ing upon the substantial rights of this appellant. 
Re·spectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney General, 
ZELPH S. CALDER, 
... L\ssistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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